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Adults effortlessly and automatically infer complex pat-
terns of goals, beliefs, and other mental states as the causes
of others’ actions. Yet before the last decade little was known
about the developmental origins of these abilities in early
infancy. Our understanding of infant social cognition has
now improved dramatically: even preverbal infants appear
to perceive goals, preferences (Kushnir, Xu, & Wellman, in
press), and even beliefs from sparse observations of inten-
tional agents’ behavior. Furthermore, they use these infer-
ences to predict others’ behavior in novel contexts and to
make social evaluations (Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2007).
Inspired by this work, computational modelers have in
the last few years begun to formalize the knowledge and
inference mechanisms underlying infants’ social reasoning
(Baker, Saxe, & Tenenbaum, 2009; Lucas, Griffiths, Xu, &
Fawcett, 2009; Ullman et al., 2010). Many of these models
share deep similarities, explaining social inference in terms
of an intuitive understanding of how an agent chooses among
actions. For instance, the principle of rational action, sug-
gested in seminal work on infant social cognition (Gergely,
Na´dasdy, Csibra, & Biro´, 1995), states that agents will select
the best action to achieve their goals, given the constraints of
their environment – or in a more sophisticated version, given
their beliefs about the environment. This principle has been
formalized using notions of planning and decision-making
from economics and computer science. It underlies models
that make accurate quantitative predictions of the social in-
ferences of adults and young children in a variety of experi-
mental tests.
The goal of this symposium will be to bring together de-
velopmental psychologists and computational modelers in a
dialogue on the social inferences made by young infants,
the mechanisms by which these inferences work and become
more sophisticated in older children. The first talk of the sym-
posium (Baker et. al) will briefly survey now-classic work on
infants’ understanding of goals and beliefs, and will intro-
duce a general computational framework for modeling these
social inferences based on intuitive principles of rational ac-
tion. Next will be two pairs of developmental and compu-
tational talks, focusing on recent advances where there has
been important exchange between empirical work and mod-
els. Kushnir, et al, and Lucas, et al, will describe work on
understanding of others’ preferences. Hamlin, et al, and Ull-
man, et al, will describe attribution of “prosocial” goals (such
as helping). The symposium will conclude with a discussion
led by Spelke, highlighting gaps in our understanding of in-
fant social cognition, areas where more computational work
is needed, and where computational ideas might suggest new
areas for developmental experiments.
Close interaction and collaboration between developmen-
talists and computational modelers studying infant social cog-
nition is a fairly recent trend, yet it has already proven fruitful,
as the talks in this symposium hope to demonstrate. Previ-
ously, the research to be presented here has been discussed
primarily at conferences on computational modeling (e.g.,
NIPS) or developmental psychology (e.g., the Cognitive De-
velopment Society), or in small workshops bringing together
modelers and experimentalists. The Cognitive Science Con-
ference would be an ideal venue for a broad symposium on
this emerging, interdisciplinary subfield, due to its tradition of
bringing together theorists and experimentalists from a broad
array of disciplines. We expect the symposium will inter-
est a wide audience and lead to new research directions and
collaborations engaging different segments of the Cognitive
Science audience.
Probabilistic models of belief-desire psychology
Baker, Goodman & Tenenbaum We propose a computational
framework for modeling how humans interpret intentional ac-
tions in terms of the mental states that cause behavior: chiefly,
beliefs and desires. The framework represents a schema for
intentional action using rational models of belief- and goal-
based planning from economics and computer science known
as partially observable Markov decision problems. Agents’
beliefs and desires are inferred by inverting this model of
rational planning using Bayesian inference, integrating the
likelihood of the observed actions with the prior over men-
tal states. This approach formalizes in precise probabilistic
terms the essence of previous qualitative approaches to in-
fant action understanding, (e.g. Gergely et al., 1995). We
will present results showing that our models account for in-
fants’ and adults’ social judgments from a body of experi-
ments, from simple inferences about goals, to joint inferences
of preferences and beliefs. We will also consider how a set of
alternative, heuristic-based models compare to our account.
Young children use statistical sampling to infer the pref-
erences of others
Kushnir, Wellman & Gelman Psychological scientists use
statistical information to determine the workings of fellow
humans. We argue so do young children. In a few years,
children progress from viewing human actions as intentional
and goal-directed to reasoning about the psychological causes
underlying such actions. Here we show that preschoolers
and 20-month-old infants can use statistical information –
namely, a violation of random sampling – to infer that an
agent is expressing a preference for one object over another.
Children saw a person remove 5 items of one type from a
container of objects. Preschoolers and infants only inferred a
preference for that type of object when there was a mismatch
between the sample and population. Mere outcome consis-
tency, time spent with and positive attention toward the ob-
jects did not lead children to infer a preference. The findings
provide an important demonstration of how statistical learn-
ing could underpin the rapid acquisition of early psychologi-
cal knowledge.
A rational model of preference learning and choice pre-
diction by children
Lucas, Griffiths, Xu & Fawcett We present a rational model
of preference learning that explains the behavior of children
in several recent experiments, as well as a developmental shift
in which children come to understand that people have dis-
tinct preferences. We first show that a simple econometric
model can account for young children’s use of statistical in-
formation in inferring preferences and their ability to general-
ize others’ preferences from one category to another. We then
consider the question of how children begin to treat other in-
dividuals as having preferences that can differ from their own,
showing that such a transition is consistent with Bayesian in-
ference, given a model in which all people share preferences
and one in which preference can vary as possibilities. Finally,
we discuss novel predictions made by our model concerning
preference understanding and the developmental shift.
The enemy of my enemy is my friend: Infants interpret
social behaviors in context
Hamlin, Wynn & Bloom Recent research suggests that
young infants prefer prosocial to antisocial individu-
als (Hamlin et al., 2007). While a preference for those who
help others is certainly adaptive, there are potentially situa-
tions in which unhelpful behavior is more appropriate (e.g.
punishing others for their wrongdoing) or more socially diag-
nostic (e.g. “The enemy of my enemy is my friend,” Aronson
& Cope, 1968). This talk examines whether infants always
prefer those who are prosocial, in contexts in which antiso-
cial behavior could be seen as punishment, or in which an
individual’s antisocial behavior may be an indication that he
or she shares a negative opinion toward a disfavored other.
Results suggest that even in the first year of life, infants eval-
uate behaviors not only in terms of their valence, but also in
terms of certain qualities of their recipients.
Help or hinder: Models of social goal inference
Ullman, Baker, Goodman & Tenenbaum Everyday social in-
teractions are heavily influenced by our snap judgments about
others’ goals. Even young infants can infer the goals of inten-
tional agents from observing how they interact with objects
and other agents in their environment: e.g., that one agent
is ‘helping’ or ‘hindering’ another’s attempt to get up a hill
or open a box. We propose a model for how people can in-
fer these social goals from actions, based on inverse planning
in multiagent Markov decision problems. The model infers
the goal most likely to be driving an agent’s behavior by as-
suming the agent acts approximately rationally given envi-
ronmental constraints and its model of other agents present.
We also present behavioral evidence in support of this model
over a simpler, perceptual cue-based alternative.
Discussion: Open challenges and future directions
Spelke The closing discussion will draw out gaps in our
current understanding of infant social cognition, areas where
more computational work is needed, and places where com-
putational ideas might suggest new areas for developmental
experiments.
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